




**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

***Friday  
4 January 1980***

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The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section, will often contain materials that update other articles in the *Daily*.

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SITUATION REPORTS

AFGHANISTAN

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*reaction to the invasion has been adverse, with several demonstra-*  
*tions aimed at Soviet diplomatic installations.*

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Soviet Behavior

A TASS commentator yesterday provided the first Soviet response to President Carter's New Year's Eve interview on television. Calling the President's remarks "militant and malicious," the commentator charged him with distorting Soviet policy. He did not specifically refer to the President's charge that Brezhnev had, in effect, lied to him, however. Rather, he repeated the now-familiar Soviet allegations of US interference in

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Afghan internal affairs and accused the US of using Soviet "assistance" to Afghanistan to camouflage the "very real American military threat" to Iran. [redacted]

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TASS also noted the President's decision to request postponement of full Senate debate on SALT II, and said that the situation in Afghanistan was only a pretext and the "American administration and reactionary quarters in the US" had long been working to delay ratification of SALT II. [redacted]

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Moscow is busy lobbying for international support.

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#### Muslim Reaction

In Iran, broadcasts attacking Moscow's move into Afghanistan have continued, although Ayatollah Khomeini has not yet spoken publicly on the Soviet action. The Iranians wish to avoid any serious deterioration in their relations with the USSR, largely because they hope that the Soviets will veto any tough resolution on sanctions that comes before the UN Security Council. [redacted]

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[redacted] Meanwhile, revolutionary guards assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran again dispersed anti-Soviet demonstrators yesterday. [redacted]

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An anti-Soviet demonstration also took place near the Soviet Embassy in Khartoum, but Sudanese authorities prevented some 2,000 marchers--mainly students voicing anti-US as well as anti-Soviet slogans--from entering the compound. In Istanbul one student was killed in an exchange of gunfire between Turkish security guards at the Soviet Consulate and a band of armed youths. [redacted]

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## IRAN

*UN Secretary General Waldheim met again yesterday with Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh, but he left Tehran this morning--a day ahead of schedule--without having met with Ayatollah Khomeini.* [redacted]

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Waldheim met yesterday with Ghotbzadeh for a second time, but both men have been close-mouthed on the substance of their discussions. Waldheim also met yesterday with members of the Revolutionary Council, after which Council spokesman Hibibi announced that Waldheim would not see Khomeini. [redacted]

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Domestic Developments

Admiral Madani, who had declared himself as a candidate for president, has resigned as Commander of the Iranian Navy to devote himself to the elections. He apparently is retaining his position as Governor of Khuzestan Province. Madani is being replaced as Navy Commander by his deputy, Admiral Mahdud Alavi. [redacted]

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

NORTH YEMEN: Security Official Removed

*President Salih's reported dismissal yesterday of pro-Saudi National Security Director Khamis and three of his top aides will likely increase the fears of Saudi Arabia and its North Yemeni supporters that Salih is preparing to make a deal with Marxist South Yemen.*

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By  
purging Khamis, Salih probably hopes to continue improving relations with Aden while at the same time removing a key Saudi supporter from his government.

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EL SALVADOR: Resignations

*Yesterday's mass resignation of Salvadoran Government officials narrows the political base on which the military, which ousted President Romero in October, can construct another coalition. The Christian Democrats, the best organized political party, seem ready to help form a new government, but they or any successor coalition will face destabilization efforts by leftists.*

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The five-man junta--two military and three civilians--and the predominantly civilian cabinet formed 11 weeks ago never resolved internal differences nor adequately defined programs. Leftists attempting to accelerate reform and eradicate rightist influence precipitated the current crisis. Church and military efforts at compromise during the last few days foundered over irreconcilable viewpoints.

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Public remarks yesterday by leaders of the left-of-center Christian Democrats--who served in the cabinet but not the junta--indicate their intent to participate in a new government. In recent negotiations with the military, party leaders have sought effective control of a new junta, prior agreement on clearly formulated programs, and elimination of certain military hardliners and private sector representatives from the government.

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If the Christian Democrats can obtain a working majority in a new junta, they should be able to create a more cohesive and disciplined administration. They will, however, be subject to immediate charges of a sellout to the conservative military. The leftist insurgents who have accelerated attacks against the government in the last month will also present any new administration with the immediate problem of better defining guidelines for the security forces. The armed forces' recently toughened response to the left helped touch off the current crisis and the far left will attack any new coalition.

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Among other alternatives, the armed forces could opt to form a purely military government, but this would be subject to the harshest attacks from the left and appears viable only as a short-term bridge to elections, if that.

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# EGYPT-CHINA: More Military Cooperation

*Egypt and China are continuing to expand their military cooperation.*

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[redacted]  
[redacted] the Chinese have recently supplied Egypt with enough spare parts to bring seven aging Soviet-built AN-12 transport aircraft back into operation. The Egyptians reportedly hope to have another seven or eight AN-12s operational within a few months with Chinese help.

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The refurbishing of much of Egypt's AN-12 fleet, which the Egyptians were nearly ready to abandon a year ago, will markedly improve the Air Force's transport capacity. For most of the last two years, Egypt has been almost totally dependent on its 18 US-supplied C-130s. An Egyptian TU-16 bomber is scheduled for overhaul in China this week.

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Over the last year, Egypt has provided China with two MIG-23 fighter aircraft and a complete SA-6 surface-to-air missile system for technical exploitation. In return, the Chinese have either given or sold Egypt on favorable terms some 90 Chinese-made fighters, spare parts for Soviet-built equipment, at least two batteries of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, and some naval missiles. These Chinese-made arms do not satisfy Egypt's long-term requirements for new technology, but they will help tide the Egyptian military over as it moves to replace its Soviet inventory with newer Western weaponry.

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SUDAN: Movement Away From Egypt

*Sudan's concern over a slowdown in economic aid from moderate Arab states is the major factor behind Khartoum's waning support for the Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement. Sudan attaches considerable importance to its defense and economic ties with Egypt, however, and will try to avoid a serious downturn in relations.*

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Sudan will undoubtedly try, however, to maintain its other relations with Egypt, particularly defense ties. Both states presumably will seek to avoid jeopardizing the mutually advantageous defense pact in effect since 1976. Close economic cooperation is also well established, including the sharing of Nile water, joint economic projects, trade agreements, and communications and travel arrangements.


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## KAMPUCHEA: Anticipated Port Closures

*The Vietnamese puppet regime in Kampuchea plans to close temporarily the deepwater port at Kompong Som and the airport at Phnom Penh to international relief deliveries.* [redacted]

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Phnom Penh and Hanoi have informed international relief organizations in Kampuchea and a shipping concern in Singapore that Kompong Som will be closed in mid-January for a month or more to enable port authorities to concentrate on offloading vessels from the USSR and other Soviet Bloc countries. Soviet traffic into the port has been heavy in recent weeks. Kampuchean authorities also have informed a relief official in Phnom Penh that the Phnom Penh airport is to be closed to international relief flights for the "first 10 to 15 days" of January and that entry visas would be denied to international relief workers for that period. [redacted]

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The only explanation given for these restrictions is the celebration of the first anniversary of the installation of the Heng Samrin regime. The real motive for the shutdown may be to bolster the Vietnamese armed forces in preparation for their anticipated campaign to eliminate Pol Pot's resistance forces. The closures would curtail international observation of military supply activities. [redacted]

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Authorities in Phnom Penh have not announced any closure of the city's river port, and have in fact encouraged increased World Food Program deliveries through that facility. Relief officials note, however, the port's capacity is severely restricted by a shallow channel, low water level, and limited unloading equipment. [redacted]

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Port closings will have little immediate impact on food distribution to the Kampuchean populace. Most of the 50,000 tons of relief food already delivered by international agencies remain in warehouses in Kompong Som and Phnom Penh. This distribution bottleneck has prompted the UN to halt further deliveries temporarily. Kompong Som is Kampuchea's only deepwater port, and prolonged closure to relief supplies could have serious consequences for Kampucheans several months hence. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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MOZAMBIQUE-CUBA: Protocol of Cooperation

According to Mozambican press reports, a new agreement between Maputo and Havana calls for sending some 700 Cuban technicians and teachers to Mozambique in 1980. Cuba already has about 200 military and 500 civilian advisers in Mozambique, and it is not clear whether the protocol will increase the Cuban presence by 700 or whether new advisers will replace the current group. In an effort to help Mozambique revive its economy, Cuba is pledging technical assistance in transport, communications, health, education and national planning. In addition, an estimated 4,000 Mozambicans are studying in Cuban schools. [REDACTED]

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#### OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the Intelligence Community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

#### USSR-Afghanistan

An official obituary published in Moscow yesterday announced the "untimely" death on 28 December of Soviet Lieutenant General Viktor Paputin, 52, a member of the Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the Central Committee. Paputin was known to be in Kabul in early December, and the date of his death coincides with fierce street fighting in the city following the Soviet-backed coup on 27 December.

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